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isbn-10 0-511-07337-2 eBook (EBL) isbn-10 0-521-81438-3 hardback isbn-10 0-521-89128-0 paperback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of s for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. Liberal political philosophy sometimes seems beset by a curiously naive literal-mindedness. We write as though the tasks of politics were reducible to the choice of principles, and as though principles formulated in the theorist's study could constitute the basic structure of a wellordered society. We know, of course, that the articulation of principles for a liberal order is a tricky business; they have to be sensitive to all sorts of things, such as the tensions between liberty and equality, equality and opportunity, rights and efficiency, and stability and justice. And so we spend years -collectively we spend decades or generations -debating them, elaborating them, refining them. All this is done in the hope that if only we could get the principles right, we would have a basis for a decent, just, and prosperous social order, which could be enshrined in our laws and constitution. Occasionally, in the wee small hours of the morning, it occurs to some of us that principles, formulated and refined by theorists, are not necessarily the key to a well-ordered society; laws and constitutions are often eclectic and half-coherent accumulations of wisdom rather than embodiments of well-worked-out principles; and anyway, laws and constitutions are not all that there is to social order. There is also the real worldthe world of human nature in its more sordid or less calculable aspects, the world of chance and fortune, of crime, fanaticism, and war, of tears of pride and rage, the real world of faith, patriotism, and other creeds we would like to be able to dismiss as non-rational. Sometimes, it seems, these make a mockery of our devotion to principle-mongering. One response to these misgivings is to attempt a further refinement of our principles -attempting to make them more sensitive to various issues and vicissitudes of the real world. We might incorporate incentives into our theories or make greater provision for exceptions or sanctions or whatever. But a response of that kind seldom allays the nocturnal misgiving. What torments some of us is the possibility that there might be something wrong with our entire orientation to politics. For example, there might be something awry with the idea that governance shares with theory an orientation towards propositions. Let me explain what I mean. A principle is a normative proposition that says that things ought to be thus-and-so. A law inspired by a principle is supposed to be an imperative proposition: Let things be thus-and-so (and let this-or-that person be responsible for making them thus-and-so). And the law (and the principle it embodies) is supposed to work when things actually are thus-and-so, that is, when the society in question is actually governed, through its laws, by the principles we have formulated in the way that the principles say it ought to be governed. Maybe -and this is the thought that, as I said, comes to us in the small hours of the morningthere is more (and less) to the good ordering of society than this. Think of it this way: A society is not just a set of states of affairs, corresponding (or failing to correspond) to the content of a given set of normative propositions. It is a congeries of relations, dispositions, and emotions that are implicated with one another and with shared arrays of fear, hope, and history, in ways that defy any tidy propositional scheme. Now perhaps it is the error of communitarians and nationalists to pretend that this congeries represents an homogenous body of experience rather than something rich, ragged, and variegated. But liberal political philosophers are always in danger of making the opposite mistake -of thinking that it can be ignored altogether, or simply dragooned into the service of efficiency or justice.
These thoughts are not original. Since Edmund Burke complained about "all the decent drapery of life" being "rudely torn off" by those who would reduce the science of government to a priori speculation, there has been no shortage of critics to challenge liberal theory on this ground. They line up around the block. But there has always been a shortage of thinkers willing to do the hard work of giving an affirmative account of what is supposed to be lacking in the liberal picture, thinkers who are not content merely to carp, but who set out to show what a richer and more adequate philosophy of politics would look like. Ajume Wingo is one of the very few who are willing and able to do this, and for that reason I believe this book marks the emergence of a refreshing new voice in political theory.
As you read on into Veil Politics, you will find a deep, subtle, and sometimes disconcerting account of the role of myth, symbolism, monument, xii Preface and ritual in modern politics. Much of it is about the United States: Dr. Wingo begins at the Lincoln Monument and proceeds down the Mall to end with some reflection on the racially rather sanitized depiction of American history in the rotunda of the U.S. Capitol. In between, you will read about classroom history, war memorials, the inscriptions on our currency, the Confederate flag, the Great American Seal, and the Gettysburg Address. These are sites and emblems of a politics -and of a kind of legitimacy -that goes much deeper than proposition or principle. "To make us love our country," wrote Burke, "our country ought to be lovely." Well, these are places where the love is elicited or withheld, and where loveliness or its opposite are put on display for all to see. It is places like these we must recur to if we want to develop an aesthetics of governance.
But I don't want to give the impression that Veil Politics is just about America, or that the part that is about America is an uncritical celebration. Quite the contrary -this book is also an account of the evasion, shame, dispute, and false consciousness embedded in this country's iconography. What Wingo insists, however, is that these too are not just matters of the truth or falsity of propositions, or the satisfaction or violation of principles. They are not just about what lies behind the veil; they are features of the veil itself.
And Veil Politics is not just a study of America. The fact that it is above all a work of theory -a fine work of political theory -is an irony, I guess, in light of the way I began these comments. But Wingo has succeeded not just in his critique of contemporary theory; he has succeeded in his ambition to theorize the very matters whose absence from our conventional theorizing is the premise of his work. The veil politics of the United States may be the starting point, but what is important about this book is the reflection that they stimulate and the way that Dr. Wingo is able to fold that reflection back into the traditions and experience of existing theory, to complement it and enrich it. He is helped in this by a remarkable openness and generosity of spirit. I mentioned already that Wingo's contribution is affirmative, rather than merely critical. His aim is not to discredit liberalism, as though that were worth doing for its own sake. Perhaps more generously than we liberal thinkers deserve, he sets out to nurture themes in liberal thought that have been subdued, and to push a little into the background those jagged aspects of our political philosophy that we have tended stupidly to exaggerate. He seeks to enrich and contextualize our discussions of legitimacy, autonomy, justice, even transparency, and to make us ponder their significance. He does not seek simply to discredit them.
At the dawn of our tradition, we learned from Aristotle that the best political theory is the offspring of comparative politics; we see how to theorize our own politics when we make it strange to ourselves by comparing it to the politics of another society. Now, as I said, Ajume Wingo writes about the United States, and it is contemporary American liberalism that he is seeking to enrich. But he does so as an outsider, an African, a Cameroonian, of royal blood and considerable political experience. Those who remain inward-looking quickly learn to miss or blur the most interesting features of the politics of their own society. There is no chance of that with this book. We should be grateful to Ajume Wingo for teaching us to see things new and for showing us -in a way that many of us would do well to imitate -how the new things that we see can be incorporated into our reflection on the things that for too long have been dominating our vision.
New York July 30, 2002
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